program-specific reports including survival performance measures has increased since October 2002, when they were first published online by the Scientific Registry for Transplant Recipient (SRTR).
Although the OPTN used quality standards to identify non-compliant centers, it did not enforce any sanctions for underperformance.
This changed with a CMS regulation on March 30, 2007 , increasing oversight of transplant centers. In the "Conditions of Participation" (CoP) defined in the regulation effective June 28, 2007 , CMS took a regulatory approach by stating that programs failing to comply with the OPTN quality performance standards risk decertification for Medicare coverage, the new enforcement mechanism. 13 Before getting decertified for Medicare coverage, non-compliant programs are put on probation and are listed on the OPTN's website as "members not in good standing." As Medicare remains the primary insurance for end stage renal disease (ESRD) patients seeking kidney transplantation, 14 decertification and loss of Medicare reimbursement would likely mean program closure.
According to the OPTN quality standards, a center's performance is considered non-compliant if its observed risk-adjusted survival rates are lower than its expected survival rates in addition to having (a) the difference between the number of observed events (ie, patient deaths or graft failures) and expected events larger than 3 (O-E > 3); (b) a ratio of observed to expected events larger than 1.5 (O/E > 1.5); and (c) a one-sided P-value less than 0.05, based on an exact Poisson test for the difference between observed and expected events. 13 Historically, Medicare, Medicaid, and commercial insurers implemented quality improvement strategies in surgery (eg, bariatric and cardiac surgery) to divert patients away from "poor-performing" providers to those likely to have superior results for specific procedures. 1, 15, 16 Through these access and reimbursement restrictions, payers sought to regionalize care at high-performing providers, and therefore improve average patient population outcomes. Unlike prior quality improvement strategies in surgery, the intent of the kidney transplantation CoP was not to regionalize transplantation care but rather to improve overall quality of care in a corrective manner.
Though high-quality designation in surgery was found to be associated with an increase in procedure volume, it did not translate into better average patient population outcomes. 17, 18 A propos kidney transplantation, earlier studies indicated that procedures declined at low-performing centers [19] [20] [21] but also suggested ancillary factors that could have attenuated potential benefits from the CoP (eg, higher rates of organ waste). 22 Markedly, to comply with regulations, transplant centers may adopt stringent eligibility criteria for waiting-list admission to the detriment of riskier patients who may benefit from transplantation 23 or avoid innovative and highrisk procedures. 24 Moreover, it is not clear whether the impact of the regulation on the number of transplants in low-performing centers translates into changes in other health outcomes for wait-listed patients (eg, death, transfers to other centers) and into changes in transplantation trends in high-performing centers. Understanding how the regulation interacts with these health outcomes and potential spillovers to "high-performing" centers could inform on designing future quality improvement strategies in surgery in general and in transplantation of solid organs in particular. This study offers a more comprehensive approach to assessing the relationship between the quality standards enforcement through CMS regulatory oversight and trends in kidney transplantation, and examines changes in other health outcomes in addition to the number of transplants and changes in practice at high-performing centers. 
| CON CEP TUAL MODEL

| Study sample
There were 227 centers specializing in adult kidney transplantation 
| Outcome measures
Dependent variables were grouped into two conceptual catego- due to all other reasons. All outcome measures were constructed using the UNOS STAR data.
| Explanatory variables
Transplant centers' compliance with quality standards was evaluated under the three criteria mentioned above (O-E > 3; O/E > 1.5;
and one-sided P-value < 0.05) separately for 1-year graft survival and patient survival rates resulting in two survival performance ratings per evaluation report. A center-specific report indicated whether its observed survival rates were statistically higher than, statistically lower than, or not significantly different from the expected rates.
Using the three performance evaluation criteria listed above, 
| EMPIRI C AL S TR ATEGY
I analyzed the relationship between centers' subpar quality performance and trends in kidney transplantation following the CMS CoP implementation. I used a before-and-after design with a panel structure to assess associations. The panel regression model for this design was defined as follows:
where y ijt was the outcome variable for center i in donor service area j in period t. The subscript t denoted half-year periods. The coefficient of interest, â 1 , measured variations in the dependent variable specific to low-performing centers relative to centers in were period specific and did not vary across centers-and ε ijt identified an idiosyncratic error term.
Equation (1) was estimated using a fixed-effect approach and standard errors were clustered at the center level. Negative binomial regressions were estimated for count variables and leastsquares regressions were estimated for rate variables. Incidence rate ratios were reported for negative binomial regressions, whereas estimated coefficients were reported for least-squares regressions.
When considering trends at high-performing centers, the group of compliant centers was further divided into two mutually exclusive subgroups. There was the group of high-performing centers representing programs that were never flagged for noncompliance with quality standards and which had observed 1-year survival rates larger than the corresponding expected rates (O > E), in addition to having a one-sided P-value less than 0.05 (P-value < 0.05). The second group comprised standard-performing centers, which were programs performing at par with quality standards but which did not qualify as high performing under the criteria defined above. Standard-performing centers included programs that had met at most two of the three non-compliance thresholds. When using these additional classifications, transplant centers were therefore grouped into three performance categories: (a) low-performing (centers ever flagged on either graft or patient survival rates), (b) standard-performing, and (c) highperforming programs.
Hence, Equation (1) was augmented to include another interaction term between Post CMS CoP t and High Performing ijt status.
The coefficients of interest in Equation (2) were ̂1 and ̂2 , representing the changes in the dependent variables associated with classification into low-performing and high-performing category post-regulation, respectively, relative to standard-performing centers. 
| Descriptive characteristics
The sample included 2959 center-period observations with 1693 observations pre-CMS CoP. Seventy-three centers were assigned to low-performance status for graft survival rates as opposed to sixty-nine centers for patient survival rates. A total of forty-six centers were low-performing on both metrics at the same time, indicating considerable overlap between the two performance measures.
Ninety-six centers were low-performing on either graft or patient survival rates.
Compared with centers meeting quality standards pre-CMS CoP, lowperforming centers enrolled significantly less patients (55 vs 79 for performance in both settings, Table 1 ) and conducted less transplants (28 vs 35), on average. Other differences were noted in higher rates of waitinglist deaths (22.3 vs 20.3 percent in both settings, Table 1 ) and slightly lower rates of transfer (4.7 vs 5.3 percent) out from low-performing centers. Consistent with low-quality designation in both settings, average graft failure rates in the first three years post-transplantation were 2 to 3.4 percentage points higher at low-performing centers (Table 1) . percent), relative to centers meeting quality standards. However, low-performing centers had slightly less patients with high sensitization (3.6 vs 3.9 percent in both settings, Table 1 ). around implementation of the CMS CoP, whereas centers meeting quality standards remained on an increasing trajectory (Figure 1 Transfer rates increased during the publication phase to remain stagnant at low-performing centers post-implementation, whereas they slightly declined at centers in compliance ( Figure S1 Notes: See notes in Table 2 . Coeff, coefficient; IRR, incidence rate ratio. Low-performing centers are defined as centers ever flagged for non-compliance with quality standards on either graft or patient survival rates.
F I G U R E 2
| Regression-adjusted results
a Indicates significance at the 90% level. Table 2 ).
The regulation was also associated with a notable increase in the rate of waiting-list transfers out from low-quality centers by about 2 to 3 percentage points (or 2 to 3 per 100 patients), all else constant (Table 2) . Statistically significant associations were also estimated with graft failure rates, which decreased at low-performing centers following the regulation implementation by up to 2 percentage points (or 2 per 100 failures) within one year of transplantation and 3 percentage points within three years (Table 2 ). These associations were substantial given the average graft failure rates ranging from 6.0 to 6.8 percent within one year and 11.2 to 12.2 percent at the 3-year mark at low-quality centers ( Table 2 Table 3) at high-performing programs. This reduction was not driven by a decrease in admission of any single patient category (Table S2 ).
Relative to average-performing programs and considering both 
| D ISCUSS I ON
Concurrent with previous studies, [19] [20] [21] Medicare-based quality ratings were associated with important reductions in trends in kidney transplantation with substantial declines in transplant procedures at low-quality centers in periods following the regulation. Nonetheless, this shift was only partially captured by high-quality programs.
Additionally, geographic dispersion of transplant centers could limit the extent to which transplants lost to low-performing programs would be absorbed by centers meeting quality standards. Although the estimated decrease in transplant procedures may not represent all feasible procedures because of variations in quality of donated organs, patients' health conditions, and matching with donors, the modest but steady increase in supply of organs 25 Though findings may not suffice to conclude that access has declined, the increasing prevalence of ESRD over the years 14 coupled with the consistently increasing number of donors and the growing gap between waiting-list additions and (deceased-and living-donor) transplant volume over time 25 raise concerns.
The estimated reduction in graft failure rates at low-performing centers may imply an increase in quality of transplantation or a decline in transplantation of either marginal organs or riskier patients. 12, 26, 43 The potential welfare effects of avoiding high-risk patients for enrollment and transplantation, or those associated with a decrease in the use of marginal kidneys for transplantation, were not clear and would require comparison of patients' benefits from transplantation to costs for patients remaining on dialysis, costs to which would be added the estimated costs to all other patients enrolled in the same programs if the centers were to close for low performance.
This analysis used rich data combining centers' report cards and several patient outcomes, to evaluate the relationship between the CMS CoP and trends in measures of access and quality of transplantation care. In addition to utilizing long time periods before the regulation, the use of various center-specific characteristics as confounders offered additional robustness to the analyses and contribution.
A limitation to this analysis is that although the conditions of participation apply to all liver and kidney transplant centers, the study only emphasized kidney transplantation. Because transplant facilities have multiple organ transplant programs (eg, kidney, liver, heart, pancreas, and kidney-pancreas) within their centers, low-quality designation on kidney (or liver) transplant outcomes may have some spillover effects on other programs. Nonetheless, investigating kidney transplant programs independently is salient because kidney remains the most transplanted solid organ in the United States. 25 Future research should investigate the case of liver transplantation to inform on whether the relationship between the regulation and trends in transplantation varies across organ types.
Consistent with earlier findings of volume increase at highquality programs following Medicare-based accreditation in bariatric surgery, 17, 18 results in this study showed that policy change enforcing quality standards in kidney transplantation was associated with a modest increase in transplants at high-performing centers.
In light of findings on enrollments and transplants, an evaluation of the regulation's potential welfare effects is warranted. The CMS may therefore consider making the regulation less punitive for programs that expand access by employing new strategies and techniques in transplantation, so as to maximize the use of donated organs. This would alleviate risk-averse behavior that may lead to deleterious impacts on overall access to transplantation in the long run. Results, indicating the partial shift in procedures from low-to high-performing centers, also have implications for public policies increasing regionalization of specialty care to "Centers of Excellence." In sum, CMS should be aware of changes in provision of care associated with this regulation, when designing future quality improvement strategies. 
ACK N OWLED G M ENTS
CO N FLI C T O F I NTE R E S T
The authors have no conflicts of interest to report.
O RCI D
Mariétou H. Ouayogodé http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4628-0015
